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Abstract
We determine whether or not a local regional government should privatize its
local public ¯rm in a mixed duopoly when it faces the problem of unidirectional
transboundary pollution. We consider two regions in an economy, one located
upstream and the other, downstream. Where both the local public ¯rm owned
by the local government upstream and the private ¯rm are located and compete
upstream, we analyze two cases: (h) the private ¯rm is owned by private investors
upstream and (f) it is owned by private investors downstream. A comparison of
the two cases presents the following results. Partial privatization is desirable for
local welfare upstream in (h), but it is not always desirable in (f). In both (h)
and (f), it is desirable for local welfare downstream and for the overall welfare
of the economy when the degree of environmental damage and the fraction of
transboundary pollution upstream are low. However, when they are high, the
results change for (h) and (f).
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1 Introduction
Transboundary pollution such as that caused by acid rain and water and air pollution
has been attracting attention since the middle-nineteenth century. For example, acid
rain, which has long been recognized as a serious environmental problem in Europe, has
become a serious issue in East Asia over the past few decades.1 For another example,
for the past several years, waste that is believed to be generated in Russia, China, and
Korea has been regularly found on the shores of northern Japan, where it is carried by
the sea. To solve this problem, Japan and Korea held working-level talks in February
2009.
Meanwhile, global warming continues to worsen the environment worldwide. It can
a®ect the fraction of transboundary pollution to a large extent because global warming
may cause the Westerlies to meander and increase the frequency of natural calamities.2
Therefore, while analyzing the transboundary pollution problem, we pay attention to not
only the total amount of pollution but also its transboundary fraction from one region
to the other.
In some of the countries and regions mentioned above, there still exist mixed markets
where public and private ¯rms compete. In these mixed markets, the privatization of
public ¯rms is a major issue because it changes their objectives and thus, their behavior.
Since the welfare-maximizing public ¯rm takes into consideration environmental dam-
age, the e®ect of privatization on social welfare depends on the a®airs associated with
1Nagase and Silva (2007) provide, in detail, the extent of damage caused by acid rain in China and
Japan. Ichikawa and Fujita (1995) estimate the contribution of China to be about one-half of the total
with respect to the wet deposition of sulfate in Japan. For other transboundary pollution issues, Ohara
et al. (2001) indicate the threat of an increase in ozone, sulfate, and nitrate, causative factors of the
existing urban ozone in China, which may greatly impact the air quality in Japan in the future.
2The meandering Westerlies will also a®ect the present amount of air-borne pollutants and toxic
chemicals (which cause acid rain) that are carried between the countries. Heavy rains transport city
waste that may be lying on the riverbed or in waste collection sites located along the river into the river.
Floods then transfer this waste to downstream areas. An increase in the atmospheric temperature and
surface level of the sea and a decrease in the salinity of the seas due to the melting glaciers may alter
the °ow of the oceans and thus a®ect the amount of waste that is carried from one country to another.
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transboundary pollution. In particular, when we consider the partial privatization of
public ¯rms, the welfare-maximizing degree of this partial privatization may be a®ected
by the fraction of transboundary pollution. Of course, in many cases, partial privatiza-
tion in one country or region a®ects not only its own welfare but also welfare of other
countries or regions through changes in the equilibrium outcome, including the in°uence
of transboundary pollution. We therefore pose the following two questions: (1) How does
the fraction of transboundary pollution a®ect the welfare-maximizing degree of partial
privatization? (2) Does partial privatization in one country or region enhance welfare of
other countries or regions and that of the whole world?
In order to answer these questions, we have developed a model. The model considers
two regions, with one located downstream of the other, and two ¯rms, a public ¯rm
and a private ¯rm. In our model, the market is opened only upstream, and both ¯rms
exist there. We consider two cases: (h) the private ¯rm is owned by private investors
upstream and (f) it is owned by private investors downstream. In the literature of the
mixed oligopoly theory, we often observe di®erent results between (h) and (f).3 This
is because the behavior of the public ¯rm changes from (h) to (f) and the pro¯t of the
private ¯rm is included in the objective of the public ¯rm in (h) but not in (f).
In recent years, some studies have addressed the environmental issue in a mixed
oligopoly. B¶arcena-Ruiz and Garz¶on (2006), Beladi and Chao (2006), Wang and Wang
(2009), and Wang, Wang, and Zhao (2009) consider emission tax in the domestic mar-
ket, whereas Ohori (2006a, 2006b) considers the same in the international market. Kato
(2006, 2010) and Naito and Ogawa (2009) compare some environmental policies. They
examine environmental regulation in a mixed oligopoly and analyze the e®ects of priva-
tization. Cato (2008) investigates the relationship between the degree of environmental
damage and privatization. However, because these works deal with the environmental
problem in one region, they do not take into consideration transboundary pollution.
From among the earlier work conducted on transboundary pollution, Nagase and
3For example, Fjell and Pal (1996), Fjell and Heywood (2004), Matsumura (2003), and Lu (2006)
demonstrate the di®erent results in the case wherein the competitors of the public ¯rm are domestic
private ¯rms and the case wherein they are foreign private ¯rms.
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Silva (2007) is closely related to our motivation. Nagase and Silva (2007) consider the
situation where one region (China) is located upstream of another region (Japan) under
unidirectional transboundary pollution.4 However, their main interest is to examine an
environmental policy-making game between the two, and therefore, it di®ers from ours
with regard to focusing on the e®ect of privatization. In China, a large number of public
¯rms have been privatized since the 1990s.5 However, mixed oligopoly is still prevalent
in several industries that depend on energy from fossil fuels, especially coal. Thus, the
analysis of transboundary pollution in the framework of the mixed oligopoly theory may
lead to a new approach in the research on the transboundary pollution problem.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model.
Section 3 derives the equilibrium outcome under di®erent cases of private ¯rm ownership
and conducts a welfare comparison. Section 4 compares the results obtained in the previ-
ous section. Section 5 concludes the main text. Detailed calculations for the equilibrium
outcome in each case and proofs of the propositions are given in the Appendices.
2 Model
Consider an economy of two regions: regions A and B. Region A is located upstream
of region B. In this economy, there is one local public ¯rm (¯rm 0) owned by the local
regional government of A and one private ¯rm (¯rm 1) owned by private investors from
either region A or region B. Both the ¯rms are located in region A and produce a
homogeneous product that harms the environment. We call this product a \dirty good."
Firms 0 and 1 compete in quantity. The output of ¯rm i is denoted by qi (i = 0; 1).
Total output is denoted by Q = q0 + q1. We assume that the cost function of ¯rm i is
given by ci(qi) = cq
2
i =2. Given the inverse demand function of the dirty good, p = p(Q),
4Nagase and Silva (2007) consider a competitive market and allow an abatement e®ort and an
emission tax policy.
5For an overview of the reform of state-owned enterprises in China, see Fern¶andez and Fern¶andez-
Stembridge (2007).
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and then, the pro¯t of ¯rm i is
¼i(q0; q1) = p(Q)qi ¡ ciqi
2
:
A representative consumer exists in each region. The representative consumer in
region A consumes the dirty good and a clean numeraire good. The representative
consumer in region B only exists.
The representative consumer in region A maximizes U(Q)+y subject to pQ+y = m,
where p denotes the price of the dirty good, y denotes the amount of the numeraire
good, whose price is normalized to 1, and m denotes the income of the representative
consumer. We assume that U(Q) is
U(Q) = aQ¡ Q
2
2
: (1)
Therefore, we obtain the following inverse demand function, p(Q) = a¡Q by solving
the utility maximization problem of the representative consumer in region A.
In our model, pollution is generated by either production or consumption and is
harmful to the environment. Producing or consuming one unit of a dirty good gener-
ates one unit of pollution. The pollution is converted into environmental damage which
reduces the consumer surplus via a lump-sum transfer. We do not consider the case
where pollution is generated by both production and consumption. In our setting, pol-
lution is generated only in region A and there is no di®erence between pollution through
production and that through consumption. Therefore, in the subsequent instructions
and analyses, we consider the case that pollution is generated by production. The total
pollution in region l is denoted by El (l = A;B); the total environmental damage in
region l is denoted by Dl(El) = d(El)
2=2.
We assume that pollution is transboundary and can a®ect the environment in region
B. We now explain how transboundary pollution is considered in the model. Pollution
is generated only in region A because both ¯rms produce in region A; the amount of
pollution generated is Q. We assume that region A is located upstream of region B
(along a river or in the path of a periodic wind), and therefore, some of the pollution is
transported to region B. The fraction of pollution that remains in region A is µ 2 [0; 1];
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therefore, the fraction of pollution transported to region B is (1¡µ). Thus, the pollution
levels in regions A and B are µQ and (1¡ µ)Q, respectively.
This paper examines two cases of ownership of the private ¯rm: case (h), where ¯rm
1 is owned by private investors from region A, and case (f), where it is owned by private
investors from region B. Figure 1 shows the two cases and the amount of pollution of
two regions by the unidirectional transboundary pollution.
In the model, welfare is de¯ned as the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus,
and environmental damage.
First, we consider case (h), wherein ¯rm 1 is owned by private investors from region
A. Welfare in region A is given by
wA =
Z Q
0
p(s)ds¡ cq
2
0
2
¡ cq
2
1
2
¡ d(µQ)
2
2
+m: (2)
Welfare in region B is given by
wB = ¡df(1¡ µ)Qg
2
2
: (3)
Welfare in the economy is de¯ned as the sum of the welfare in regions A and B. Thus,
W =
Z Q
0
p(s)ds¡ cq
2
0
2
¡ cq
2
1
2
¡ d(µQ)
2
2
¡ df(1¡ µ)Qg
2
2
+m: (4)
Second, we consider case (f). In this case, ¯rm 1 is owned by private investors from
region B. Welfare in region A, welfare in region B, and the total welfare are respectively
given by
wA =
Z Q
0
p(s)ds¡ p(Q)q1 ¡ cq
2
0
2
¡ d(µQ)
2
2
+m; (5)
wB = p(Q)q1 ¡ cq
2
1
2
¡ df(1¡ µ)Qg
2
2
; (6)
W =
Z Q
0
p(s)ds¡ cq
2
0
2
¡ cq
2
1
2
¡ d(µQ)
2
2
¡ df(1¡ µ)Qg
2
2
+m: (7)
We denote the welfare of region l as \local welfare l" and the welfare in the entire
economy as \total welfare." Further, we de¯ne the local regional government of l as \local
government l."
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Here, we de¯ne the objective function of each ¯rm. The objective functions of public
¯rm U0 and private ¯rm U1 are respectively given by
U0 = ®W + (1¡ ®)¼0; ® 2 [0; 1]; (8)
U1 = ¼1: (9)
When ® = 0, ¯rm 0 is a pure pro¯t-maximizer, and when ® = 1, it is a pure local
welfare-maximizer. Here, ® is understood as the share holding of the public sector and
1¡® is that of the private sector.6 The objective of ¯rm 1 is to maximize its own pro¯ts.
Finally, we consider the following timing of the game. Before the game begins, the
public ¯rm is perfectly owned by local government A, that is, ® = 1. When the game
starts, local government A chooses the level of ®, and then, the two ¯rms choose their
quantity simultaneously.
3 Equilibrium outcomes and welfare comparison
In this section, we derive the equilibrium outcome and compare three types of welfare
before and after privatization in cases (h) and (f). First, we examine case (h).
3.1 Case (h)
We ¯rst consider the case where ¯rm 1 is owned by private investors from region A.
Local welfare A, local welfare B, and total welfare are respectively de¯ned as (2),
(3), and (4).
In the second stage, each ¯rm maximizes its objective by choosing its quantity. The
¯rst-order condition of the maximization problem of ¯rms 0 and 1 are respectively given
by
@U0
@q0
= a¡ (2¡ ®+ c+ d®µ2)q0 ¡ (1 + d®µ2)q1 = 0; (10)
@U1
@q1
= a¡ q0 ¡ (2 + c)q1 = 0: (11)
6For a rationalization of this objective function, see BÄos (1991) and Matsumura (1998).
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Solving the above ¯rst-order conditions, we obtain
qh0 =
a(1 + c¡ d®µ2)
(1 + c)(3 + c)¡ (2 + c)®+ (1 + c)d®µ2 ; (12)
qh1 =
a(1 + c¡ ®+ d®µ2)
(1 + c)(3 + c)¡ (2 + c)®+ (1 + c)d®µ2 ; (13)
whA =
2a2(1 + c)f(1 + c)(4 + c¡ 2dµ2)¡ (5 + 2c¡ 4dµ2 ¡ 2cdµ2)®g
2f(1 + c)(3 + c)¡ (2 + c)®+ (1 + c)d®µ2g2 ;
+
a2®2f3 + c¡ dµ2(3 + 2cdµ2)g
2f(1 + c)(3 + c)¡ (2 + c)®+ (1 + c)d®µ2g2 ; (14)
whB = ¡
a2d(2 + 2c¡ ®)2(1¡ µ)2
2f(1 + c)(3 + c)¡ (2 + c)®+ (1 + c)d®µ2g2 ; (15)
W h =
a2f2(1 + c)2(4 + c¡ 2d)¡ 2(1 + c)(5 + 2c¡ 2d)®¡ 2d®2µ2(2 + cdµ2)g
2f(1 + c)(3 + c)¡ (2 + c)®+ (1 + c)d®µ2g2
+
a2f(3 + c¡ d)®2 + 2d(2 + 2c¡ ®)2µ + 4d(1 + c)(¡2¡ 2c+ 3®+ c®)µ2g
2f(1 + c)(3 + c)¡ (2 + c)®+ (1 + c)d®µ2g2 +m;
(16)
where the superscript h denotes the equilibrium outcome in the second stage in case
(h) except for ®. With regard to ®, the superscript denotes the equilibrium outcome
in the full game. In the subsequent section, this superscript is also used to represent
the equilibrium outcome in the second stage. To restrict our attention to the case of
the interior solution, we assume that 1 + c ¸ d. We also assume that c ¸ 1 in order to
simplify the subsequent analyses.
Here, we examine the comparative statics for the equilibrium output of each ¯rm
with respect to ®. We ¯nd that
@qh0
@®
< 0;
@qh1
@®
> 0; and
@Qh
@®
< 0; if and only if dµ2 >
1
2
: (17)
In terms of local welfare A, there are two distortions in the region. One is caused by
underproduction with regard to the duopolistic market and the other is caused by excess
production with regard to environmental damage. A high level of d and µ imply that a
large fraction of pollution remains in region A and environmental damage is large. In
this case, the latter distortion dominates the former one, and therefore, the local public
¯rm decreases its output when it gives greater weight to local welfare A.
In the ¯rst stage, local government A chooses ® in order to maximize local welfare
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A.7 Solving for ®, we obtain
®h =
(1 + c)2
1 + 3c+ c2
: (18)
The result shows that partial privatization is desirable for local welfare A. We also ¯nd
that ®h does not depend on the fraction of transboundary pollution and the degree of
environmental damage. Rather, these results depend on the functional forms of demand,
cost, and environmental damage.8
Does partial privatization of the local public ¯rm enhance local welfare in
the other region and the total welfare? (welfare comparison)
We examine whether the optimal privatization for local welfare A enhances local
welfare B and the total welfare. Comparing local welfare B and total welfare at ® = 1
and ® = ®h, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. When µ = 1 or dµ2 = 1=2, wBj®=1 = wBj®=®h. Consider the case where
µ 6= 1 and dµ2 6= 1=2. Then,
wBj®=1 ¡ wBj®=®h > 0 if d > 12 and µ 2
³q
1
2d
; 1
´
;
wBj®=1 ¡ wBj®=®h < 0 if
8<: d >
1
2
and µ 2
h
0;
q
1
2d
´
;
d < 1
2
and µ 2 [0; 1):
Proof. See Appendix B.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 1 for each value of the fraction of transboundary
pollution and the degree of environmental damage.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. When µ = 1, no fraction of the
pollution caused in region A is transported to region B, and therefore, ® does not a®ect
7The second-order condition of the maximization problem is satis¯ed. See Appendix A.
8The amount of total output and output level of each ¯rm a®ect the decision with respect to ®h.
Speci¯cally, the total output level a®ects both the marginal utility of the representative consumer and the
marginal environmental damage. The larger is the total output, the larger are the marginal utility and
marginal environmental damage. On the other hand, the output level of each ¯rm a®ects its marginal
production cost: the di®erence between the marginal production costs of ¯rms is maximized at ® = 1
and minimized at ® = 0. As local government chooses ® taking into account both total output level and
production ine±ciency, partial privatization would not always be chosen given other functional forms.
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local welfare B. When µ 6= 1, some portion of the pollution generated in region A is
transported to region B. Local welfare B is based on environmental damage. We know
that the environmental damage function is a function of the total output and that the
total output decreases (increases) with an increase in ® when µ > (·) 1=p2d. Suppose
the case where d and µ are small (large). When the local public ¯rm is not privatized,
that is, ® = 1, it produces more (less) and the total output is larger (smaller) than when
® = ®h. The larger (smaller) the total output is, the larger (smaller) the total emission
is. Therefore, ® = ®h (® = 1) is more desirable than ® = 1 (® = ®h) for local welfare B.
Next, we investigate the total welfare. We compare total welfare at ® = 1 and ® = ®h.
Calculating W j®=1 ¡W®=®h , we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2.
W j®=1 ¡W j®=®h > 0 if d > 12 and µ 2
³q
1
2d
; ¹µ
i
;
W j®=1 ¡W j®=®h < 0 if
8>>><>>>:
d > 1
2
and µ 2
h
0;
q
1
2d
´
;
d > 1
2
and µ 2 [¹µ; 1];
d < 1
2
and µ 2 [0; 1];
where ¹µ is the solution of W j®=1 ¡W®=®h = 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. When µ and d are small, we ¯nd
that partial privatization enhances welfare of both regions A and B from (18) and Propo-
sition 1. Therefore, the total welfare is larger after partial privatization. When µ and
d are large, partial privatization increases local welfare A but decreases local welfare B.
Remember that local welfare B is composed of ¡DB(EB) and EB = (1 ¡ µ)Qh. When
µ and d are su±ciently large, EB becomes su±ciently small. A decrease of local welfare
B is overcome by an increase of local welfare A. Therefore, the total welfare is larger
under partial privatization when µ and d are either small or large. Figure 3 shows these
results.
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3.2 Case (f)
We consider the case where ¯rm 1 is owned by private investors from region B.
Local welfare A, local welfare B, and total welfare are respectively de¯ned as (5),
(6), and (7).
In the second stage, each ¯rm maximizes its objective by choosing its quantity. The
¯rst-order condition of the maximization problem of ¯rms 0 and 1 are respectively given
by
@U0
@q0
= a¡ (2¡ ®+ c+ d®µ2)q0 ¡ (1¡ ®+ d®µ2)q1 = 0; (19)
@U1
@q1
= a¡ q0 ¡ (2 + c)q1 = 0: (20)
Solving the above ¯rst-order conditions, we obtain
qf0 =
a(1 + c+ ®¡ d®µ2)
(1 + c)(3¡ ®+ c+ d®µ2) ; (21)
qf1 =
a(1 + c¡ ®+ d®µ2)
(1 + c)(3¡ ®+ c+ d®µ2) ; (22)
wfA =
a2f(1 + c)2(6 + c¡ 4dµ2)¡ 2(1 + c)c®(1¡ dµ2)¡ (2 + 3c)(1¡ dµ2)2®2g
2(1 + c)2(3¡ ®+ c+ d®µ2)2 ; (23)
wfB =
a2f(2 + c)(1 + c¡ ®)2 ¡ 4(1 + c)2(1¡ 2µ)d+ (2 + c)®2dµ4g
2(1 + c)2(3¡ ®+ c+ d®µ2)2
+
2a2(¡2¡ 4c¡ 2c2 + 2®+ 3c® + c2®¡ 2®2 ¡ c®2)dµ2
2(1 + c)2(3¡ ®+ c+ d®µ2)2 ; (24)
W f =
a2f(1 + c)2(4 + c¡ 2d¡ 2®+ 4dµ ¡ 4dµ2 + 2d®µ2)¡ c®2(1¡ dµ2)2g
(1 + c)2(3¡ ®+ c+ d®µ2)2 +m: (25)
Here, we analyze the comparative statics for the equilibrium output of each ¯rm with
respect to ®. We ¯nd that
@qf0
@®
< 0;
@qf1
@®
> 0; and
@Qf
@®
< 0; if and only if dµ2 > 1: (26)
In the ¯rst stage, local government A chooses ® in order to maximize local welfare
A. Solving for ®, we obtain9
9In Appendix D, we show that the second-order condition of the maximization problem is satis¯ed.
For the calculation of ®f , see Appendix E.
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®f =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
¹® if
8>>>><>>>>:
0 < d < c
1+2c
and µ 2 [0; 1];
c
1+2c
< d and µ 2 [0;
q
c
d(1+2c)
];
3+2c
2(1+c)
< d and µ 2 [
q
3+2c
2d(1+c)
; 1];
1 if
8><>:
c
1+2c
< d < 1 and µ 2 [
q
c
d(1+2c)
; 1];
1 < d and µ 2 [
q
c
d(1+2c)
;
q
1
d
];
0 if
8<: 1 < d <
3+2c
2(1+c)
and µ 2 [
q
1
d
; 1];
3+2c
2(1+c)
< d and µ 2 [
q
1
d
;
q
3+2c
2d(1+c)
];
where
¹® =
(1 + c)f3 + 2c¡ 2dµ2(1 + c)g
(3 + 6c+ 2c2)(1¡ dµ2) : (27)
From the result, we ¯nd that ®f depends on the fraction of transboundary pollution
and the degree of environmental damage. Figure 4 illustrates ®f for each d and µ. When
both d and µ are small or large (region I or IV ), partial privatization (®f = ¹®) is chosen.
When they take a middle value, local public ¯rm A is fully privatized (region III) or is
not privatized at all (region II).
The intuition behind the result is as follows. First, we consider the case where d
and µ are su±ciently large. In this case, environmental damage is severe in region A,
and thus, the local public ¯rm produces less when ® = 1 than when ® = ¹®. Suppose
a marginal decrease of ® at ® = 1. A marginal increase of output of the public ¯rm
does not a®ect welfare because the public ¯rm is a local welfare maximizer when ® = 1.
However, the marginal decrease of output of the private ¯rm improves welfare because
it reduces the environmental damage. Therefore, partial privatization enhances welfare.
Second, we consider the case where d and µ are su±ciently small. In this case, the
degree of environmental damage is low, and thus, we regard this case as no environmental
problem in a mixed duopoly to some extent. Suppose a marginal decrease of ® at ® = 1.
As is the same reason mentioned in the previous paragraph, a marginal decrease of
output of the public ¯rm does not a®ect welfare. However, a marginal increase of output
of the private ¯rm increases consumer surplus. Therefore, partial privatization enhances
welfare.
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Finally, we consider the case where d and µ take a middle value. In this case, the
equilibrium output in a mixed duopoly is nearly the same as that in a pure duopoly. For
example, consider the case where dµ2 = 1. In this case, the reaction function of the local
public ¯rm does not depend on ®: the reaction function of each ¯rm is symmetric. And
thus, either full privatization or no privatization can be chosen.
Does privatization of the local public ¯rm enhance local welfare in the
other region and the total welfare? (welfare comparison)
We examine whether the optimal privatization for local welfare A enhances local
welfare B and the total welfare. We compare local welfare B and total welfare at ® = 1
and ® = ®f .
Here, we compare local welfare B before and after privatization. Because the level
of ®f depends on the values of parameters, we separate the cases for each ®f . Figure 4
shows the level of ®f for the values of parameters: ¹® is chosen by the local government
A in regions I and IV , 0 in region III, and 1 in region II. In each region, the results of
the welfare comparison before and after privatization are as follows.
Proposition 3.
wBj®=1 ¡ wBj®=¹® > 0 if d > 3+2c2(1+c) and µ 2
³q
3+2c
2d(1+c)
; 1
i
;
wBj®=1 ¡ wBj®=¹® < 0 if
8><>: d >
c
1+2c
and µ 2
·
0;
q
c
d(1+2c)
¶
;
d < c
1+2c
and µ 2 [0; 1]
wBj®=1 ¡ wBj®=0 > 0 if d > 1 and µ 2
³q
1
d
;
q
3+2c
2d(1+c)
i
:
Proof. See Appendix F.
According to Proposition 3, when the degree of environmental damage and the frac-
tion of transboundary pollution remaining in region A are low, privatization of the local
public ¯rm in region A enhances local welfare B, but when they are high, privatization
worsens the welfare. Figure 5 shows these results.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. Local welfare B is based on the sum
of ¯rm 1's pro¯t and environmental damage. We know that the environmental damage
function is a function of the total output and that the total output decreases with an
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increase in ® when µ > 1=
p
d. We also see that ¯rm 1's pro¯t increases with an increase
in ® when µ > 1=
p
d because the price of the dirty good increases with an decrease in the
total output, and the output of ¯rm 1 increases as a result of the strategic substitution
e®ect. Thus, we ¯nd that local welfare B increases with an increase in ® when µ >
1=
p
d. When µ < 1=
p
d, the results are opposite, that is, local welfare B decreases with
an increase in ®.
Lastly, we compare total welfare between ® = 1 and ® = ®f . As in the case of the
welfare comparison for region B, we separate the cases for each ®f . The results of the
welfare comparison in terms of before and after privatization are as follows for each case.
Proposition 4.
W j®=1 ¡W j®=¹® > 0 if d > 3+2c2(1+c) and µ 2
³q
3+2c
2d(1+c)
; 1
i
;
W j®=1 ¡W j®=¹® < 0 if
8><>: d >
c
1+2c
and µ 2
·
0;
q
c
d(1+2c)
¶
;
d < c
1+2c
and µ 2 [0; 1]
W j®=1 ¡W j®=0 > 0 if d > 1 and µ 2
³q
1
d
;
q
3+2c
2d(1+c)
i
:
Proof. See Appendix G.
Figure 6 shows Proposition 4. According to Proposition 4, when the degree of en-
vironmental damage and the fraction of transboundary pollution remaining in region
A are low, privatization of the local public ¯rm in region A enhances the total welfare
because local welfare A and B both increase. However, when the same are high, local
welfare B is worsened considerably, and the total welfare decreases. Thus, in terms of
total welfare, privatization is not desirable.
4 Comparison between cases (h) and (f)
We compare the results obtained in cases (h) and (f). There are three major points.
1. Partial privatization is chosen in case (h), but partial privatization, full privatiza-
tion, or no privatization can be chosen in case (f).
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2. Partial privatization enhances wA, wB, and W in both cases when the degree of
environmental damage and the fraction of transboundary pollution remaining in
region A are low.
3. Partial privatization enhances W and reduces wB in case (h), but it reduces both
wB and W in case (f) when the degree of environmental damage and the fraction
of transboundary pollution remaining in region A are high.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper examines the e®ect that the privatization of a local public ¯rm has on local
welfare in two regions and on the overall welfare of the two regions when the fraction of
unidirectional transboundary pollution varies. We analyze this problem by considering
two separate cases of ownership of a private ¯rm.
We discuss the possible implication of our results. Consider the example of the rela-
tionship between China upstream and Japan downstream. Since the twenty-¯rst century,
several Japanese ¯rms have entered the Chinese market. From China's point of view,
it is more complex to calculate the optimal degree of privatization in terms of welfare
of China in this situation than in the situation where the competitor of the public ¯rm
is a domestic private ¯rm; the optimal degree of privatization varies for each value of
the degree of environmental damage and the fraction of transboundary pollution. When
the pollutant has a moderate degree of environmental damage, the Chinese government
should pay particular attention to the trend of the fraction of transboundary pollution,
since there is a possibility that its fraction is a®ected by recent extreme weather condi-
tions.
This paper uses a simple framework to consider the privatization problem in the
context of the unidirectional transboundary pollution problem. Therefore, several ex-
tensions of this analysis are possible. For example, we can consider the case wherein
¯rms can abate the possible pollution. If ¯rms can reduce their pollution by investing
some abatement e®ort, the public ¯rm produces more when it can invest abatement ef-
fort than when it cannot, because in the latter case, it has to reduce its output in order
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to reduce pollution. As a result, the welfare-maximizing degree of partial privatization
changes and the e®ect of partial privatization of the upstream public ¯rm on welfare of
each region might change to a large extent. We can also extend our model to examine
the case wherein a market for dirty goods exists in both countries, wherein a generation
of pollution occurs in the country located downstream, and wherein the government can
impose the environmental regulations such as emission taxes and quotas on ¯rms. We
leave these analyses for future research.
Appendix A
The ¯rst-order condition of the maximization problem of local government
A Partially di®erentiating whA with respect to ®, we obtain
@whA
@®
=
a2(1 + c)f(1 + c)2 ¡ (1 + 3c+ c2)®g(1¡ 2dµ2)2
f(1 + c)(3 + c+ d®µ2)¡ (2 + c)®g2 = 0: (28)
We can easily ¯nd that the denominator is positive. We focus on the numerator.
When dµ2 = 1=2, whA does not depend on ®. When dµ
2 6= 1=2, we can derive the optimal
degree of partial privatization level for local government A, that is, ®h.
The second-order condition of the maximization problem of local govern-
ment A
To determine whether ®h is the maximizing value for whA, we calculate the second-
order condition of the maximization problem for local government A. Then, we obtain
@2whA
@®2
= ¡ a
2(1 + c)(1¡ 2dµ2)2X0(c; d; µ; ®)
f(1 + c)(3 + c+ d®µ2)¡ (2 + c)®g4 · 0; (29)
where
X0(c; d; µ; ®) = (1 + c)(¡3 + c+ 3c2 + c3) + 2(2 + c)(1 + 3c+ c2)®
+(3¡ 2®)dµ2 + (9¡ 8®)cdµ2 + (9¡ 8®)c2dµ2
+(3¡ 2®)c3dµ2 > 0: (30)
Note that a strict inequality holds when dµ2 6= 1=2. Therefore, the second-order condition
is satis¯ed when dµ2 6= 1=2.
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Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1. Calculating local welfare B when ® = 1 and ® = ®h, we respec-
tively obtain
whBj®=1 = ¡
a2(1 + 2c)2(1¡ µ)2d
2f1 + 3c+ c2 + (1 + c)dµ2g2 ; (31)
whBj®=®h = ¡
a2(1 + 5c+ 2c2)2(1¡ µ)2d
2f1 + 7c+ 5c2 + c3 + (1 + c)2dµ2g2 : (32)
Comparing the above, we obtain the following equation:
whBj®=1 ¡ whBj®=®h =
¡a
2cd(1 + c)(1¡ µ)2(1¡ 2dµ2)f2 + 17c+ 37c2 + 22c3 + 4c4 + 2(1 + c)(1 + 4c+ 2c2)dµ2g
2f1 + 3c+ c2 + (1 + c)dµ2g2f1 + 7c+ 5c2 + c3 + (1 + c)2dµ2g2 :
From the above equation, we ¯nd that wBj®=1 = wBj®=®h when µ = 1. Consider the
case where µ 6= 1. Whether or not wBj®=1 ¡ wBj®=®h is positive depends on the sign of
1¡ 2dµ2. Thus, we can derive Proposition 1.
Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 2. Calculating the total welfare when ® = 1 and ® = ®h, we re-
spectively obtain
W hj®=1 = a
2f1 + 5c+ 8c2 + 2c3 + (1 + 2c)2(2µ ¡ 1)d¡ 4c2dµ2 ¡ 2cd2µ4g
2(1 + 3c+ c2 + dµ2 + cdµ2)2
+m;
(33)
W hj®=®h =
a2f(1 + 6c+ 2c2)(1 + 7c+ 5c2 + c3) + (1 + 5c+ 2c2)2(2µ ¡ 1)dg
2(1 + 7c+ 5c2 + c3 + dµ2 + 2cdµ2 + c2dµ2)2
¡a
2f4c(1 + 7c+ 5c2 + c3)dµ2 + 2c(1 + c)2d2µ4g
2(1 + 7c+ 5c2 + c3 + dµ2 + 2cdµ2 + c2dµ2)2
+m: (34)
The di®erence between them is
W hj®=1 ¡W hj®=®h =
a2c(¡1 + 2dµ2)X1(c; d; µ)
2f1 + 3c+ c2 + (1 + c)dµ2g2f1 + 7c+ 5c2 + c3 + (1 + c)2dµ2g2 ;
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where
X1(c; d; µ) =c+ 7c
2 + 5c3 + c4 + 2d+ 19cd+ 54c2d+ 59c3d+ 26c4d+ 4c5d
¡ 2(1 + c)(2 + 17c+ 37c2 + 22c3 + 4c4)dµ
+ 2d(1 + 9c+ 21c2 + 25c3 + 12c4 + 2c5 + d+ 6cd+ 11c2d+ 8c3d+ 2c4d)µ2
¡ 4(1 + c)2(1 + 4c+ 2c2)d2µ3 + 2(1 + c)3(1 + 2c)d2µ4: (35)
When dµ2 = 1=2, there is no di®erence between them. We consider the case where
dµ2 6= 1=2. Whether or not the di®erence is positive depends on both the sign of ¡1+2dµ2
and that of X1(c; d; µ). At ¯rst glance, it is not clear whether or not X1(c; d; µ) is positive.
In the subsequent analyses, we examine the property of X1(c; d; µ).
First, we check the monotonicity of X1(c; d; µ) in µ 2 [0; 1]. Partially di®erentiating
X1(c; d; µ) with respect to µ, we ¯nd that
@X1(c; d; µ)
@µ
=2df¡(1 + c)(2 + 17c+ 37c2 + 22c3 + 4c4)
+ 2(1 + 9c+ 21c2 + 25c3 + 12c4 + 2c5 + d+ 6cd+ 11c2d+ 8c3d+ 2c4d)µ
¡ 6(1 + c)2(1 + 4c+ 2c2)dµ2 + 4(1 + c)3(1 + 2c)dµ3g: (36)
Summing up the above terms, we ¯nd that @X1(c; d; µ)=@µ = 2dX2(c; d; µ), where
X2(c; d; µ) =¡ 2(1¡ µ)f1 + 9c+ 21c2 + 25c3 + 12c4 + 2c5 + 2(1 + c)3(1 + 2c)dµ2g
+ 2(1¡ µ)(1 + c)2(1 + 4c+ 2c2)dµ ¡ c(1 + 12c+ 9c2 + 2c3)
¡ 4c(1 + c)2dµ2: (37)
The above calculation shows that the second term is positive whereas the other terms
are negative. As the upper bound of d is assumed to be 1 + c, we substitute 1 + c into d
only in the second term of the above equation. Summing up the calculation, we obtain
X2(c; d; µ) =¡ 2(1¡ µ)f1¡ µ + (9¡ 7µ)c+ (21¡ 17µ)c2 + (25¡ 19µ)c3
+ 2(6¡ 5µ)c4 + 2(1¡ µ)c5 + 2(1 + c)3(1 + 2c)dµ2g
¡ c(1 + 12c+ 9c2 + 2c3)¡ 4c(1 + c)2dµ2 < 0: (38)
Therefore, we ¯nd that @X1(c; d; µ)=@µ < 0.
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Second, we check the sign of X1(c; d; 0) and X1(c; d; 1). When µ = 0, we ¯nd
X1(c; d; 0) = c+ 7c
2 + 5c3 + c4 + 2d+ 19cd+ 54c2d+ 59c3d+ 26c4d+ 4c5d > 0: (39)
When µ = 1, we ¯nd
X1(c; d; 1) = ¡c(¡1 + 2d)(1 + 7c+ 5c2 + c3 + d+ 2cd+ c2d): (40)
When d > 1=2, this term is negative. As mentioned previously, X1(c; d; µ) decreases with
respect to µ, and therefore, there exists a unique ¹µ 2 [0; 1] at which X1(c; d; ¹µ) is equal to
0. When d < 1=2, this term is positive. Then, X1(c; d; µ) is always positive in µ 2 [0; 1].
Finally, we examine the magnitude of the relation between
p
1=(2d) and ¹µ. Substi-
tuting
p
1=(2d) into µ in X1(c; d; µ), we ¯nd
X1(c; d;
r
1
2d
) = d(1 + c)(3 + c)(1 + 2c)(1 + 5c+ 2c2)
Ã
1¡
r
1
2d
!2
¸ 0; (41)
where a strict inequality holds when d 6= 1=2. As X1(c; d; µ) is a decreasing function with
respect to µ and X1(c; d; ¹µ) = 0, we ¯nd that
p
1=(2d) · ¹µ, where a strict inequality
holds when d 6= 1=2.
On the basis of the above analyses, we can draw Figure 3 and derive Proposition
2.
Appendix D
The ¯rst-order condition of the maximization problem of local government
A Partially di®erentiating wfA with respect to ®, we obtain
@wfA
@®
=
2a2(1¡ dµ2)f(1 + c)(3 + 2c¡ 2(1 + c)dµ2)¡ (3 + 6c+ 2c2)(1¡ dµ2)®g
(1 + c)2(3 + c¡ ®+ d®µ2)3
= 0: (42)
When dµ2 = 1, wfA does not depend on ®. When dµ
2 6= 1, we derive ¹® by solving the
above equation with respect to ®. Note that because both the sign and value of ¹® vary
with the value of the parameters of c, d, and µ, it is necessary to examine ¹® in detail.
For further details regarding ®f , see Appendix E.
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The second-order condition of the maximization problem of local govern-
ment A
To determine whether ¹® is the maximization value for wfA, we calculate the second-
order condition of the maximization problem of local government A. Then, we obtain
@2wfA
@®2
= ¡4a
2(1 + c)(1¡ dµ2)2Y0(c; d; µ; ®)
(1 + c)2(3 + c¡ ®+ d®µ2)4 · 0; (43)
where
Y0(c; d; µ; ®) = c(3 + 3c+ c
2) + (3 + 6c+ 2c2)®
+3(1¡ ®)dµ2 + 6(1¡ ®)cdµ2 + (3¡ 2®)c2dµ2 > 0: (44)
Note that a strict inequality holds when dµ2 6= 1. Therefore, the second-order condition
is satis¯ed when dµ2 6= 1.
Appendix E
Derivation of ®f
Consider the case where dµ2 6= 1. There is a possibility that ¹® is negative or that ¹®
is greater than 1. In the subsequent analyses, we ascertain the sign and value of ¹® for
each value of parameter.
First, we derive the condition where ¹® is positive. In order to obtain a positive ¹®,
the following conditions have to be satis¯ed:
dµ2 < (>)
3 + 2c
2(1 + c)
and dµ2 < (>) 1: (45)
As
p
(3 + 2c)=f2d(1 + c)g >p1=d, we obtain
¹® > 0 if
8<: dµ2 < 1;dµ2 > 3+2c
2(1+c)
:
(46)
Next, we examine whether or not ®f is less than 1. Calculating 1¡ ¹®, we obtain
1¡ ¹® = c¡ (1 + 2c)dµ
2
(3 + 6c+ 2c2)(1¡ dµ2) : (47)
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When the above equation is positive, ¹® is less than 1. Thus, the conditions where ¹® is
less than 1 are given by
dµ2 < (>) 1 and dµ2 < (>)
c
(1 + 2c)
: (48)
As 1 > c=(1 + 2c), we obtain
¹® < 1 if
8<: dµ2 < c1+2c ;dµ2 > 1: (49)
Summing up the above conditions while taking into account the fact that µ must be in
[0; 1], we can draw Figure 4 and derive ®f .
Appendix F
Proof of Proposition 3. Calculating local welfare B for each value of ®f , we obtain
wfBj®=0 =
a2(2 + c¡ 4d+ 8dµ ¡ 4dµ2)
2(3 + c)2
; (50)
wfBj®=1 =
a2fc2(2 + c)¡ 4(1 + c)2(1¡ 2µ)d¡ 2(2 + 2c+ c2)dµ2 + (2 + c)d2µ4g
2(1 + c)2(2 + c+ dµ2)2
;
(51)
wfBj®=¹® =
a2fc2(2 + c)3 ¡ (3 + 6c+ 2c2)2(1¡ 2µ)dg
2f3 + 8c+ 5c2 + c3 + (1 + c)2dµ2g2
+
a2f¡(9 + 28c+ 32c2 + 14c3 + 2c4)dµ2 + (1 + c)2(2 + c)d2µ4g
2f3 + 8c+ 5c2 + c3 + (1 + c)2dµ2g2 : (52)
According to Figure 4, local government A does not privatize ¯rm 0 in region II. In this
case, local welfare B is unchanged. In region III, it is necessary to compare wBj®=1 with
wBj®=0. The result is shown by
wBj®=1 ¡ wBj®=0 = ¡ 2a
2(1¡ dµ2)Y1(c; d; µ)
(1 + c)2(3 + c)2(2 + c+ dµ2)2
; (53)
where
Y1(c; d; µ) = (2 + c)(1 + 3c+ c
2) + (2 + c)2µ2 + (1 + c)2(1¡ µ)2(5 + 2c+ d2µ2) > 0:
(54)
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Therefore, whether or not wBj®=1 is larger than wBj®=0 depends on the sign of 1¡ dµ2.
In regions I and IV , it is necessary to compare wBj®=1 with wBj®=¹®. The result is
shown by
wBj®=1 ¡ wBj®=¹® = ¡ a
2fc¡ (1 + 2c)dµ2gY2(c; d; µ)
2(1 + c)2(2 + c+ dµ2)2f3 + 8c+ 5c2 + c3 + (1 + c)2dµ2g2 ; (55)
where
Y2(c; d; µ) = c(2 + c)(7 + 16c+ 10c
2 + 2c3) + d(2 + c)(1 + 2c)(5 + 6c+ 2c2)µ2
+d(1 + c)2(12 + 31c+ 20c2 + 4c3)(1¡ µ)2
+(1 + c)2d2µ2f(5 + 10c+ 4c2)(1¡ µ)2 + 2(2 + c)µ2g > 0: (56)
Therefore, whether or not wBj®=1 is larger than wBj®=¹® depends on the sign of c¡ (1 +
2c)dµ2.
Figure 5 and Proposition 3 sum up the above analyses.
Appendix G
Proof of Proposition 4. Calculating total welfare for each value of ®f , we obtain
W®=0 =
a2f4 + c¡ 2d+ 4d(1¡ µ)µg
(3 + c)2
+m; (57)
W®=1 =
a2f2 + 4c+ 4c2 + c3 ¡ 2d(1 + c)2(1¡ 2µ)¡ 2(1 + c+ c2)dµ2 ¡ cd2µ4g
(1 + c)2(2 + c+ dµ2)2
+m;
(58)
W®=¹® =
a2f(3 + c)(3 + 12c+ 18c2 + 10c3 + 2c4)¡ (1¡ 2µ)(3 + 6c+ 2c2)2dg
2(3 + 8c+ 5c2 + c3 + dµ2 + 2cdµ2 + c2dµ2)2
¡2a
2f6 + 21c+ 26c2 + 12c3 + 2c4 + c(1 + c)2d2µ4g
2(3 + 8c+ 5c2 + c3 + dµ2 + 2cdµ2 + c2dµ2)2
+m: (59)
According to Figure 2.6, total welfare as well as local welfare B is unchanged in region
II. In region III, it is necessary to compare W j®=1 with W j®=0. The result is given by
W j®=1 ¡W j®=0 = ¡ 2a
2(1¡ dµ2)Y3(c; d; µ)
(1 + c)2(3 + c)2(2 + c+ dµ2)2
; (60)
where
Y3(c; d; µ) = ¡1 + 2c+ c2 + d(1 + c)2(5 + 2c)(1¡ µ)2 + d(3 + 3c+ 3c2 + c3)µ2
+(1 + c)2f(1¡ µ)2 + µ2gd2µ2 > 0: (61)
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Therefore, whether W j®=1 or not is larger than W j®=0 depends on the sign of 1¡ dµ2.
In regions I and IV , it is necessary to compare W j®=1 with W j®=¹®. The result is
shown by
W j®=1 ¡W j®=¹® = ¡ a
2fc¡ (1 + 2c)dµ2gY4(c; d; µ)
2(1 + c)2(2 + c+ dµ2)2(3 + 8c+ 5c2 + c3 + dµ2 + 2cdµ2 + c2dµ2)2
;
(62)
where
Y4(c; d; µ) =17c+ 47c
2 + 41c3 + 15c4 + 2c5 + 3(1 + c)2d2µ4
+ (1 + c)2d(1¡ µ)2f12 + 31c+ 20c2 + 4c3 + (5 + 10c+ 4c2)dµ2g
+ (7 + 24c+ 25c2 + 12c3 + 2c4)dµ2 > 0: (63)
Therefore, whether or not wBj®=1 is larger than wBj®=¹® depends on the sign of c¡ (1 +
2c)dµ2.
Figure 6 and Proposition 4 sum up the above analyses.
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Region A Region B
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Region A Region B
µQ
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Q
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1
Case (h)
Case (f)
(1¡ µ)Q
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(1¡ µ)Q
Figure 1: Two cases of ownership are considered in this paper. Case (h): ¯rm 1 is owned
by private investors from region A; Case (f): ¯rm 1 is owned by private investors from
region B (shaded object).
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Figure 2: Comparisons between whBj®=1 and whBj®=®h for each value of parameter of d
and µ.
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Figure 3: Comparison between W hj®=1 and W hj®=®h for each value of parameter of d
and µ.
27
µd
0
1
c
1+2c
3+2c
2(1+c)1
µ =
q
c
d(1+2c)
µ =
q
1
d
µ =
q
3+2c
2d(1+c)
®f = ¹® (Partial privatization)
®f = 0 (Full privatization)
®f = 1 (No privatization)
I
II
III
IV
Figure 4: ®f for each value of parameter of d and µ.
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wfBj®=1 > wfBj®=¹®
Figure 5: Comparisons between wfBj®=1, wfBj®=®h , and wfBj®=0 for each value of parameter
of d and µ.
29
µd
0
1
I
c
1+2c
3+2c
2(1+c)1
µ =
q
c
d(1+2c)
µ =
q
1
d
µ =
q
3+2c
2d(1+c)
W f j®=¹® > W f j®=1
W f j®=1 > W f j®=0
Unchanged
II
III
IV
W f j®=1 > W f j®=¹®
Figure 6: Comparisons between W f j®=1, W f j®=®h , and W f j®=0 for each value of param-
eter of d and µ.
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